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Ms. Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
PO BOX 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0210 
Re: State v. Bohne, 20010116-SC 
Utah R. App. P. 24(i) Supplemental Authority Letter 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
Pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I am citing to State v. 
Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (attached), in response to defendant's 
argument regarding the burden of proof under the analysis of the concurring opinion 
below. Defendant's argument is set forth under Point 2, Brief of Appellant Bohne, pages 
21 to 23, filed with this Court on August 27, 2001. Oral argument in this case is set for 
March 14, 2002. 
I appreciate your prompt distribution of this letter to the Court. 
Sincerely, 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
ssistant Attorney General 
cc: J. Bryan Jackson, counsel for appellant 
838 P.2d 1136 
(Cite as: 838 P.2d 1136) 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Arnold J. SWENSON, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 910026. 
Sept. 28, 1992. 
The state charged defendant with three counts of the 
sale of securities by an unregistered agent. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., dismissed and the state appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held that once 
defendant produces evidence that he received no 
commission or remuneration, the burden shifts to the 
prosecutor to disprove the affirmative defense. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law <®=>330 
110k330 Most Cited Cases 
Prosecutor has burden to disprove affirmative defense 
once defendant has produced evidence of it. 
[2] Securities Regulation <®=*327 
349Bk327 Most Cited Cases 
Once defendant produces evidence that he received 
no commission or remuneration in selling securities, 
burden shifts to prosecutor to disprove affirmative 
defense in prosecution for sale of securities by 
unregistered agent. U.C.A.1953, 61-1-14.5. 
*1136 R. Paul Van Dam, David N. Sonnenreich, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
James N. Barber, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellee. 
*1137 HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
The State appeals from an order dismissing a 
criminal information against defendant Arnold J. 
Swenson which charged him with three counts of the 
sale of securities by an unregistered agent in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3(1) and 61-1-21 (1989 
& Supp.1990). A motion to dismiss was filed by 
defendant before the date set for trial. In his motion, 
he contended that the definition of the term "agent" in 
section 61-1-3(1) is unconstitutionally vague in 
violation of both the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article L section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution. The trial court granted the 
motion. The State appeals under Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 26(3)(d), which grants the State 
the right to appeal an order holding a statute to be 
invalid. This court has jurisdiction of an appeal 
when a trial court order rules a statute 
unconstitutional on its face. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(g). 
Section 61-1-3(1) provides, "It is unlawful for any 
person to transact business in this state as a broker-
dealer or agent unless he is registered under this 
chapter." Defendant was charged with acting as an 
"agent," which is defined in section 61-1-13(2) as 
"any individual other than a broker-dealer who 
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or 
attempting toeffect purchases or sales of securities." 
However, that definition is qualified in the same 
section by a three-pronged exception which excludes 
a person who (1) represents an issuer, (2) receives no 
commission or other remuneration, and (3) effects a 
transaction in securities in any one of a large number 
of instances, including those set forth in section 
61-1-14(2). Pertinent to the instant case are three 
instances provided in section 61-l-14(2)(a), (d), and 
(n), which respectively exempt securities sold in 
isolated transactions, in transactions involving an 
underwriter, or in transactions not involving a public 
offering. 
The basis of the trial court's order of dismissal was 
that there are no provisions in the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, §§ 61-1-1 to -30, or elsewhere in the 
statutes which define "isolated transaction," 
"underwriter," or "public offering." Nor could the 
court find definitions of those terms in Utah case law. 
The court stated that without adequate definitions of 
those terms, it could not properly instruct the jury as 
to their proper meaning. The court further noted that 
under section 61-1-14.5, the burden of proving the 
availability of an exemption from the registration 
requirement was on defendant. It was impossible, 
the court concluded, for defendant Swenson to sustain 
his burden of establishing that he was not acting as an 
agent when he effected the securities transactions at 
issue in this case. The court held that by employing 
those terms in section 61-1-14(2) without providing 
authoritative, readily available definitions of the 
terms, the legislature had failed to advise a reasonable 
person of the nature of the securities transactions 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
83S P2d 1136 
(Cite as: 838 P.2d 1 H6, *1H7) 
which may not be effected without registration as an 
agent with sufficient clarity to meet the specificity 
requirements of due process under the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. 
We need not and do not reach the vagueness issue 
which troubled the trial court The State has 
conceded that Swenson meets prong one and prong 
three of the three-pronged test for exception from the 
definition of agent. The lack of definitions upon 
which the trial court based its order of dismissal 
concerned only prong three. The State contends that 
Swenson fails to meet only prong two ot the 
exception test, that is, he received no commission or 
other remuneration. Defendant has not attacked or 
raised any issue regarding lack of definition or 
vagueness as to prong two. We therefore reverse the 
order of dismissal and remand the case for trial solely 
on the issue of whether Swenson received a 
commission or other remuneration [ FN 1 ] 
FN1 We tote that in l'WI the legislature 
amended section 61-1-3 to include the 
following provision "A term not defined in 
Section 61-1-13 shall have the meaning as 
established by division rule The meaning 
of a term neither defined in this section nor 
by rule of the division shall be the meaning 
commonly accepted in the business 
community" § 61-1- 13(21) (current 
version at § 61-1-13(25) (Supp 1992)) 
*1138 [l][2] One other matter should be addressed. 
Section 61-1- 14.5 provides: 
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, 
criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of 
proving an exemption under Section 61-1-14 or 
an exception from a definition under Section 
61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the 
exemption or exception 
Under a literal interpretation of that statute, 
defendant would appear to have the burden of 
proving that he received no commission or other 
remuneration, thereby meeting prong two of the 
exception. Such an interpretation, however, would 
raise constitutional concerns. Both the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution require that 
the burden of proving all elements of a crime is on the 
prosecution. In re Winship, 397 U S. 358, 364, 90 
SCt. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970); 
State v Starks 62^ P 2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981). 
In Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 U S 684, 701, 95 S Ct. 
1881, 1890-91, 44 L Ed 2d 508, 520-21 (1975), the 
Copr c West 2002 No I la: 
Paae 3 
Court extended the holding in Winship to require the 
prosecution to disprove the nonavailability of 
defenses raised by a criminal defendant which served 
to negate an element of the charged offense We have 
consistently followed that policy in this state In 
State v Wood, 648 P 2d 71, 82 n. 7 (Utah 1982), we 
observed that a long line ot t tah cases imposes on 
the prosecution the burden to disprove the existence 
of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, 
once the defendant has produced some evidence of 
the defense. See also State v Knoll 712 P 2d 211, 
215 (Utah 1985). 
Like Utah, Michigan has adopted in substance the 
Uniform Securities Act. In People v Dempster 396 
Mich. 700, 242 N W 2d 381 (19^6), the defendants, 
who had been convicted of selling unregistered 
securities in violation of the Michigan Act, appealed 
They contended that the provision ot the \ct (similar 
to our section 61-1-14 5) which placed the burden of 
proving an exemption or exception upon the person 
claiming it required them to bear an unconstitutional 
burden of proving their innocence The Michigan 
Supreme Court disagreed. In that case, the 
defendants maintained that they had sold commercial 
paper, which is an exempt security. See § 
61-l-14(l)(i). The court observed that the 
defendants' claim of exemption was in the nature of 
an affirmative defense as a claim "that the accused is 
within an exception or proviso in the statute defining 
the crime." 396 Mich at "11, 242 N W 2d at 387 
(quoting Edward W. Cleary, et al., McCormick on 
Evidence § 341, at 800 (2d ed. 1972)) 
[T]he recent trend is to treat these so-called 
matters of defense as situations wherein the 
accused will usually have the first burden of 
producing evidence in order lhal the i^ne he 
raised and submitted to the jury, but at the close 
of the evidence the jury must be told that if they 
have a reasonable doubt of the element thus 
raised they must acquit. 
396 Mich at "Ml-12, 242 N W 2d at 387 (quoting 
McCormick § 341, at 802). Thus, the Michigan court 
concluded that the provision of the Uniform 
Securities Act placing the burden ot provnm AX\ 
exemption on the defendant 
must be interpreted to mean that once the state 
establishes a prima facie ui>c oi statutory 
violation, the burden of going forward, i e , of 
injecting some competent evidence of the exempt 
status of the securities, shifts to the defendant 
However, once the defendant properly injects the 
issue the state is obliged to establish the contrary 
toOng US Govt Works 
S38 P.2d 1136 Page 4 
(Cite as: 838 \ . j 
beyond a reasonable doubt. burden of proof must be and remain *1139 with the 
prosecution that defendant did in fact receive a 
Id. at 713-14, 242 N.W.2d at 388 (citations omitted). commission or other remuneration. If this 
interpretation of section 61-1-14.5 is followed, there 
will be no violation of defendant's constitutional 
rights. 
We agree with that interpretation. It accords with a 
fundamental rule of statutory construction that as 
between two possible interpretations of a statute, that 
interpretation will be favored which renders the 
statute constitutional. Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 
467, 39 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1935); see also State v. 
Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 779 (Utah Ct.App.1990). On 
remand, we direct that if defendant produces some 
evidence that he received no commission or other 
remuneration,,, thus properly raising the issue, the 
The case is remanded to the trial court foi n i,i: thei 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., and DURh * • • •  -
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
L-.MJ < *» •• -i • \ : i NT 
Copr. £ West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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I. 
JURISDICTION 
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah 
Supreme Court upon its grant of Writ of Certiorari. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties appear to be in agreement as to the facts which are generally 
comprised of the stipulated facts agreed to by the parties and submitted to the trial 
court together with testimony where each side testified as to their interpretation and 
understanding of the law and regulatory scheme. 
/// 
/// 
Page 1 of 20 
III. 
RESPONSE TO AND CLARIFICATION OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. 1: 
TO UNDERSTAND THE STATUTE CORRECTLY REQUIRES A COMPLETE 
READING OF THE ENTIRE PROVISION WITHOUT EXCLUDING PORTIONS 
OR OVER EMPHASIZING OR MISCHARACTERIZING CERTAIN WORDS. 
For more than five (5) years, the Appellant has tried to get clarification of the 
meaning and understanding of the application of the Construction Trades' Act upon 
manufactured housing by requesting a definitive interpretation of the statutory 
language articulated and codified by the Utah State Legislature. This was first 
attempted at an administrative hearing before the Board of Contractors. The Board 
decided against the Appellant and appeal was dismissed for his failure to timely file 
the appropriate filing fees. The present action takes the form of criminal charges 
filed against the Appellant for contracting without a license and the trial court and 
Court of Appeals have each ruled against the Appellant and have done so avoiding 
the very issues that Appellant has tried to have addressed for clarification and this 
avoidance now becomes the reason the Appellant continues to pursue the matter to 
the Supreme Court. 
/// 
Page 2 of 20 
No one seems to want to read the statute correctly or completely. It is 
embarrassing to have to put forth simple and commonly understood principles in 
understanding English composition in order to read a statute correctly. However, if 
Appellee can cite to Webster's Unabridged Dictionary to try to articulate what the 
statute means by defining "building", then perhaps the Court will not look unkindly 
upon Appellant's appeal to basic english sentence structure. Of course, part of the 
composition which seems to be not so well understood is that you must read an 
entire sentence from the first word to the last and not merely to the middle in order 
to understand its meaning. The statutory provisions in question on this appeal 
provide an interesting case study since the words used are not ambiguous and the 
sentence structure is not complex or confusing. Since the Construction Trades' Act 
attempts to regulate construction trades, one may start with its definitional language. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-55-102(8) (1953, as amended), offers a statutory 
or legislative definition for construction trades. 
It reads: 
(8) "construction trades" means any trade or occupation involving 
construction, alteration, remodeling, repairing, wrecking, or demolition, 
addition to, or improvement of any building, highway, road, rail road, 
dam, bridge, structure, excavation or other project, development or 
improvement to other than personal property (emphasis added). 
/// 
Page 3 of 20 
Perhaps the meaning of this sentence could be made more clear by removing 
that which does not apply and restating the last clause more clearly in a different 
way but stating the same thing. 
Doing so produces: 
(8) "construction trade" means any trade or occupation involving 
construction... of any buildinq...on real property.1 
Consequently, construction of a building that is detached from real property, 
hence that is personal property is expressly excluded from the definition of 
"construction trade." Appellee attempts to distinguish not by citing to any statutory 
authority but by focusing on the word "building" found in the definition. While this 
does not change the meaning of the sentence, Appellee seems to imply that if it is 
a building that is constructed, it is subject to the Construction Trades' Act whether 
or not it is real property or personal property. This is simply ignoring the last limiting 
clause set forth in the statutory language found within subsection (8). It could have 
been just as easy for the Legislature to state what the Appellee implies. That is, all 
buildings are subject to the construction trades whether real or personal property. 
Since it would have been easy and obvious for the Legislature to have made such 
xThe Appellant does not believe it is too presumptuous to assume that the 
phrase "other than personal property" has the same meaning as "real property" since it 
has long been an accepted and commonly understood principle in law and common 
English usage that all property is either personal property or real property. 
Page 4 of 20 
a simple statement and make the meaning clear, it strikes the Appellant as tortured 
for the Appellee to attempt to imply a meaning from language that is not actually 
used in the statute or to imply an intention where none is expressly stated. Hence, 
to simplify what has been understood from the statute's artful expression all 
construction, assembly or manufacturing of personal property is excluded from the 
construction trades. 
Second, Appellee argues that Appellant does not qualify for exemption from 
licensing under Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-55-305(6) (1953, as amended). 
Once again, the need to reiterate the importance of reading the entire sentence 
seems to be an important and overlooked consideration to understanding the 
meaning of the statutory language. If one reads subsection (6) without reading the 
introductory provision of Section 305 it is easy to see how the Court of Appeals 
mistakenly reached its conclusion in arguing that the exemption was not intended for 
those who are in construction or build buildings. However, as Judge Thome argued, 
provision 305 was not intended for a person who had no requirement to be licensed 
in the first place, such as sales people, but was intended as an exemption to those 
who were involved in construction trades, e.g. contractors or those in construction. 
/// 
/// 
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That is precisely what the introductory language of Section 305 states and yet the 
introductory language of this very important provision was overlooked entirely in 
concluding that subsection (6) was not intended to include the Appellant. 
Appellee attempts to contend or at least draw an inference to suggest that 
some type of fraud or irresponsibility will be perpetuated unless the Appellant is 
required to be licensed. Again, Appellee is not reading subsection (6) in its entirety. 
Perhaps it would be helpful to simplify the statute by excluding that which does not 
apply so as to reach a clearer understanding. The Appellant contends that the 
statute reads thus: 
Section 305... Persons may engage in acts or practices included within 
the... construction trades... without being licensed under this chapter: 
(6) a person engaged in the sale... of personal property that by its 
design or manufacture may be attached... to real property who has 
contracted with a person, firm or corporation licensed under this chapter 
to install... that property; 
In short, while the exemption language allows for the construction, assembly 
or manufacturing of material involving personal property it always maintains that 
such items, whether assembled or unassembled, be installed or affixed by one who 
is licensed under the statute. That is to say that a contractor will always be involved 
in the construction of a home whether the contractor chooses to stick build the same 
from the ground up or chooses to purchase the material in an assembled fashion 
Page 6 of 20 
from a manufacturer. There is no greater risk of fraud or irresponsibility acquiring 
assembled materials than if the contractor purchased the two by fours (2x4), drywall, 
paint, electrical wire and other accessories and assembled them himself on the 
property. The process is not compromised. The regulatory scheme is not 
compromised. The Appellant maintains that the Legislature understood the process 
and its interplay when articulating the language found in the statute. 
Notwithstanding, while Appellee attempts to draw this Court's attention to what 
the statute should not be read to mean, little has been said about explaining or 
clarifying what exactly the language says or means. Again, the language is not 
complicated and the sentence structure is not complex or confusing. Every possible 
and conceivable argument has been made to the various interpreting authorities 
setting forth bizarre and contrived inferences arguing "sears exemptions" "motor 
vehicle tax regulations" and now defining the meaning of a "building." There has 
been more confusion and ambiguity created by the various responses through the 
proceedings than would be expected in understanding so simple a concept as 
personal property. Yet, in all the arguments, in their various forms, and in their 
various forums, not once has it been suggested by those in opposition to Appellant's 
position that the reviewing authority interpret that statute after the fashion of its plain 
meaning when read in its entirety. 
Page 7 of 20 
This is all that Appellant has ever asked and this is why he has persisted or 
proceeded with such persistence and not given up because it seemed too much like 
giving in to something that was nothing but more confusion. In short, or simply put, 
the Appellant requests that this Court enforce the provisions of the law as stated or 
enforce it otherwise and explain in terms clear to understand why its plain meaning 
does not apply. 
POINT NO. 2: 
THE "CONSTRUCTION TRADES" DO NOT INCLUDE AND IN FACT 
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES CONSTRUCTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Given the direction of Appellee's argument on "construction trades", it seems 
imperative that a clear understanding be reached as to what the Legislature intended 
by the use of the term. Unlike the term "personal property" which is not defined in 
the pertinent statutes cited in the briefs of Appellant and Appellee, the term 
"construction trades" is statutorily defined and contains what Appellant believes to 
be a limitation intended by the Legislature for regulatory purposes. The definition 
is limited by its exclusion of personal property. As set forth in Appellee's brief it is 
found at Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-102(8) (1953, as amended), and states: 
(5) "construction trade" means any trade or occupation 
involving construction, alteration, remolding, repairing, 
wreaking or demolition, addition to, or improvement of any 
building, highway, road, railroad, dam, bridge, structure, 
Page 8 of 20 
excavation or other project, development or improvement 
to other than personal property, (emphasis added). 
Perhaps as significant is the absence of a more limited or restrictive definition 
for "personal property" within this definitional section of the code. It is Appellant's 
contention that if the Legislature intended to include modular construction within the 
regulatory scheme put forth by Appellee requiring that such manufacturers be 
licensed as building contractors that a first and essential step would have been to 
define or restrict the term "personal property" to mean something other than its 
general and accepted meaning or to include those types of construction of personal 
property within the regulatory scope of construction trades. 
What is further remiss from Appellee's brief is a citation to any judicial 
authority attempting to define the term "personal property" or "construction trades" 
to include activities similar to Appellant within the regulatory control of the Division 
of Professional licensing although Appellant does note that some administrative 
rulings of the Division have attempted to do so. 
POINT NO. 3: 
APPELLEE MISCONSTRUES APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE 
DIVISION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE. 
Appellee seems to infer from its argument that the Appellant is attempting to 
challenge the statutes in question. On the contrary, Appellant contends that these 
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statutes are clear and unambiguous and convey a plain meaning which is 
inconsistent with the interpretation put forth by the Division of Professional Licensing. 
The Appellant contends that a reasonable interpretation of the statutes must include 
the plain meaning of "personal property" which meaning extends to and includes 
forms of personal property other than those that could be characterized as "Sears 
exceptions" or vehicles licensed with the Department of Motor Vehicles. In short, the 
Appellant does not challenge the language of the various statutes as promulgated 
by the Legislature but the Division's restrictive and somewhat tortured interpretation 
for regulation purposes. 
POINT NO. 4: 
APPELLEE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE STATUTORY USE OF THE 
TERM "PERSONAL PROPERTY" RENDERS THE STATUTES AMBIGUOUS OR 
LEADS TO AN UNREASONABLY CONFUSED. INOPERABLE OR BLATANT 
CONTRADICTION OF THEIR EXPRESS PURPOSE. 
The Appellant and Appellee have set forth the well settled rules for statutory 
construction in Utah which seek to interpret statutes by utilizing the plain meaning 
of their words. See State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah App. 1992). See also 
World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Co.. 879 P.2d 253,259 (Utah 1994). 
As has been stated previously, the Utah Courts assume that each term in a statute 
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is used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. As noted in Appellee's brief, only if the 
language of a statute is ambiguous do the Utah Courts resort to other modes of 
construction. However, Appellee fails to demonstrate how the Legislature's use of 
the term "personal property" renders the meaning of the statute ambiguous. 
Appellee further contends that a corollary to the rule is that a statutory term should 
be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the 
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the 
statute. Appellant agrees. However, Appellant contends that Appellee has failed 
to demonstrate how an interpretation of the statute utilizing the plain meaning of 
"personal property" renders this statute confusing, inoperable or in blatant 
contradiction of its express purpose. To the contrary, the Appellant contends that the 
statutory language as promulgated is clear, decisive and definitive in expressing the 
Legislature's intent to regulate the construction trades through licensing and exempt 
certain similar activities that include a person engaged in the sale or merchandising 
of personal property that by its design or manufacture may be attached, installed or 
otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted with a person, firm or 
corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix or attach that property. 
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Appellant believes that it is important to point out that this exemption is a qualified 
one. It requires that such personal property be installed, affixed, or attached by one 
who is licensed. In the instant case, as set forth in the stipulated facts, paragraph 
3, the "[Appellant] transports and delivers the structure by "low-boy" and off loads it 
at the site. The Appellant does not do the site work, e.g. excavation, foundation, 
utilities, etc., nor does the Appellant actually install or attach the structure to the 
foundation. . . installation of the unit becomes the responsibility of the owner or a 
licensed contractor." In other words, the rationale set forth by the trial court in its 
Certificate of Probable Cause and reiterated in Appellee's brief that the "exception 
would swallow the rule" is not true. Since the statute requires that a licensed 
contractor be involved in the installation or attachment of such property to land, the 
Appellant is nothing more than a supplier of assembled materials to a contractor. 
The Appellant contends that the legislature had the foresight to see that requiring the 
licensing of a supplier of materials to a contractor would constitute an unnecessary 
redundancy in the regulatory scheme . Fabrication of quality materials and 
compliance with the appropriate building codes, the concern that did remain was 
insightfully addressed by the Legislature in Chapter 56 which was intended to 
regulate the manufactured housing industry. It assures that such construction meets 
with uniform and/or federal housing building requirements monitored through 
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inspections. The contractor and local building inspector require inspection 
certificates to insure that the item of personal property meets with the appropriate 
building code requirements. In the case of the Appellant, the product does not leave 
the yard until all inspections have been made. See paragraph 4, of Stipulated Facts. 
The Appellant contends that the Legislature foresaw that a contractor would 
be involved in the process at the time of attachment and therefore considered it 
unnecessary to require the manufacturer of the unit to also be licensed as a 
contractor under Chapter 56. Consequently, Appellant is not asserting that Chapters 
55 and 56 are mutually excluded as asserted by Appellee; rather, Appellant asserts 
that the two chapters work in conjunction with each other to insure that the one who 
installs or attaches personal property to real property is licensed as a contractor and 
the materials received, whether assembled or unassembled, meet with the 
requirements promulgated under the Uniform Building Standards Act. Such 
interpretation is plain, clear, and operable for regulatory purposes and adequately 
protects the general public from the health and safety issues associated with poor 
workmanship or poor quality materials. 
Appellant contends that notwithstanding Appellee's assertion to the contrary, 
there is no independent public policy consideration to require licensing of contractors 
except to afford a reasonable expectation of good workmanship and standard quality 
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materials in the construction of a home. This is accomplished by the present 
statutory framework that interprets the language consistently with its plain meaning. 
It does not require the tortured interpretation put forth by Appellee to accomplish the 
public policy consideration. 
POINT NO. 5: 
APPELLEE ONLY CONFUSES THE ISSUE BY ATTEMPTING TO 
DISTINGUISH APPELLANT AS ONE WHO ACTUALLY CONSTRUCTS 
MODULAR HOMES OR BUILDS A BUILDING. 
The Appellee attempts to draw distinction by asserting that Appellant is not 
only engaged in the sale or merchandising of modular homes but actually constructs 
modular homes. In short, he builds a building. Appellee concedes that he constructs 
modular homes which are buildings. He constructs modular homes just as a mobile 
home manufacturer or a manufactured home manufacturer constructs homes. Like 
a manufactured or mobile home, the Appellant's products are generally complete 
and unattached to real property. Notwithstanding, this is all addressed in the 
regulatory scheme provided through Chapter 56 which distinguishes between mobile 
homes, manufactured homes and modular construction only for the purpose of 
determining which building code requirements apply. In Utah Code Annotated § 58-
56-3(12) (1953, as amended) the Appellants particular form of construction or 
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assembly is defined under the term "modular unit". Which requires that Appellant's 
product conform to the uniform building codes and not the HUD building code. 
Moreover, as previously stated, the definition of "construction trade" in Chapter 
55 expressly excludes construction of personal property. The attempt by Appellee 
to disqualify Appellant by classifying the activity as "construction" as opposed to 
"manufacturing, assembling, or designing" is a non sequitur that adds nothing to the 
rational or logical interpretation of the statute or the intended regulatory scheme of 
the construction trades or building code requirements. 
Finally, if we look at the problem from the stand point of Appellee's 
perspective and assume its interpretation is the correct one, then shouldn't we also 
find regulatory language addressing the regulatory scheme that addresses the 
regulation and handling of certain types of personal property that Appellee believes 
to be regulated. No such regulation or scheme exists because the legislation never 
intended to include personal property under the Construction Trades' Act. It makes 
no sense to interpret the statute in a way that goes beyond that contemplated 
through its regulatory language or scheme. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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POINT NO. 6: 
THE INTERPRETATION OFFERED BY APPELLEE OF "PERSONAL 
PROPERTY" WOULD RESULT IN THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN A 
MANNER THAT WOULD RENDER IT UNREASONABLY CONFUSING. 
INOPERABLE AND IN BLATANT CONTRADICTION OF ITS EXPRESS 
PURPOSE. 
While Appellant contends that the language of the Statute is plain and 
consistent with its ordinary use and meaning, the interpretation offered by Appellee 
is illogical, confusing, and inoperable and extends the regulatory authority of the 
Division blatantly beyond its express purpose. Appellee offers two (2) explanations 
as to why the term "personal property" as set forth in Section 305(6), Chapter 55, 
Title 58, Utah Code Annotated should be limited to exclude Appellant. On the one 
hand, Appellee contends that the personal property exemption was intended to cover 
only components such as Sears products which they refer to as part of the "Sears 
exception." These would be products such as refrigerators, washing machines, 
garbage disposals, light fixtures, toilets, sinks, electrical wiring, outlet plugs, circuit 
breakers, sewer pipes, taps, faucets, etc. Effectively, any item of personal property 
that could be purchased at a Sears store (or Appellant assumes a similar 
merchandise store) would qualify under the exemption. This of course limits the 
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statutory meaning of the term "personal property" to a decision to be made by 
management of a Sears store. Since the Sears catalog has been known to change 
from year to year, a definition based upon a "Sears exception", is always illusive of 
clear understanding its in scope and meaning. What is even more confusing, 
however, is that this rationale is inconsistent with Appellee's second argument of 
limitation, that of licensing. 
The second argument of Appellee is that Appellant should not be excluded 
from licensing under the personal property exemption because he is not licensed 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Appellee cites to Administrative Rule 156-
55a-102(a) which defines personal property to mean "factory built housing and 
modular construction, as a structure which is titled by the Department of Motor 
Vehicle, State of Utah, and taxed as personal property."2 While at the time the 
Administrative Rule was enacted provision was made for the licensing of modular 
construction through the Department of Motor Vehicles, a subsequent change in the 
law exempted modular construction from licensing.3 See Utah Code Annotated § 41 -
2lf there is a factual issue of nonpayment of personal property taxes by Appellant 
it was not established at the hearing. Appellee presented no evidence and Appellant's 
testimony was uncontroverted on cross examination that he paid personal property tax 
on his construction units. See Hearing Transcript, Volume II, page 146. 
3Utah Code Annotated Section 41-1a-504(4), became law in 1992. Prior thereto, 
provision had been made for the licensing of modular construction as a motor vehicle. 
The new law exempts modular construction from licensing. However, Administrative 
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1a-504(4) (1953, as amended). Since the Administrative Rule was never changed 
to correspond with the change in the law, the Division now argues that the Rule has 
a meaning that is exactly the opposite of its previous intention and application which 
now effectively excludes all modular construction by implying that the same is not 
personal property. While this form of logic defies a general and accepted 
understanding of the term, it does nothing to explain why Appellee now believes it 
has the broadened regulatory authority to require that modular construction in the 
State of Utah only be done by licensed contractors. There is no express legislative 
regulatory authority or directive supporting such an interpretation and the application 
of such regulatory scheme would effectively exclude even what has been identified 
by Appellee as the "Sears exception". In short, Appellee's interpretation of "personal 
property" does nothing to clarify the meaning of the statute but in fact renders the 
terms ambiguous, confusing, inoperable and blatantly contrary to their express 
purpose. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
Rule 156-55a-102(8) which refers also to modular construction was never changed or 
amended to reflect this statutory change in the law and thus creates the implication that 
modular construction should now be excluded from the definition of personal property. 
Page 18 of 20 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, and also for those 
reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief, having replied to Appellees Brief, prays that 
relief be granted in reversing the trial court's decision, or remanded ordering that 
judgment be entered consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, together with 
such other and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 
^ 
DATED this day of r , 2 0 > i 
J. PRYAN JACKSON, 
Attorney for Appellant Bohne 
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